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As is often the case with important intellectual trends, the quodlibetal 
genre in early fourteenth-century England strongly fl ourished at the 
same time that it was beginning a steep decline in importance. The 
reasons for this shift of  intellectual energy away from publishing and 
circulating quodlibeta seem to have been primarily internal to the uni-
versities themselves. Here we shall survey the fl ourishing and to a lesser 
extent the decline, by looking at the quodlibetal collections of  three of  
the most infl uential Oxford theologians in the 1320s and 1330s, William 
Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot. After a brief  account 
of  the lives and careers of  these men, and a more careful accounting 
of  the latest data regarding the dating, organization, and manuscript 
traditions for their respective quodlibetal collections, we will consider 
some philosophical issues raised by the content of  their work. I shall 
treat my three subjects differently depending on how widely dissemi-
nated are the previous studies of  their collections. For Ockham, the 
textual history of  whose Quodlibeta is already well studied in print, I 
shall focus primarily and in great detail on content; for Chatton, about 
whose Quodlibet almost nothing is in print, and who is himself  not well 
known, I shall discuss biography, manuscript, dating, and general content 
equally; and for Holcot, who has received more attention than Chat-
ton but less than Ockham, I adopt an intermediate strategy concern-
ing manuscripts versus content, and detail versus general overview. In 
addition, I will briefl y discuss the Quodlibet of  an important theologian, 
John of  Rodington, who runs in this same Oxford tradition but whose 
Quodlibet de conscientia is still largely unedited. I conclude by considering 
what the contents of  these works reveal about the status of  the quod-
libetal form in this period, and its connection to some larger trends in 
English philosophical theology.
* For various forms of  assistance I owe special thanks to Jerry Etzkorn, Chris 
Schabel, Lisa Keele, the American University in Cairo, and the Bibliothèque nationale 
de France.
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General Observations
The time period under consideration here is roughly 1322 to 1334. It 
was in this period that the quodlibeta of  Ockham, Chatton, and Holcot 
were recorded and made available for circulation. Several factors make 
quodlibeta of  this era both fascinating and challenging. I want to preface 
my detailed discussion of  individual thinkers and their manuscript 
traditions by bringing some of  these characteristics to the foreground. 
I will not argue for these claims here, but will instead invite the reader 
to see how my points are exemplifi ed in the subsequent discussion of  
my three primary subjects.
Topical Range
Reading a long quodlibetal question list for a prolifi c author, such as 
Ockham or Holcot, can give a slightly misleading impression about 
topic range. These lists suggest a kind of  openness in subject matter 
that might not seem possible, for example, in a commentary on a set 
piece such as the Sentences. The initial expectation we might have looking 
at a question list for Ockham’s Quodlibeta, say, is that we are about to 
be treated to an exquisite intellectual buffet, with delicacies both rare 
and strange; we may develop the expectation as readers that we are 
facing a grand survey of  Ockhamist thought applied to surprising and 
recondite issues. Although the impression is not entirely false, this sense 
of  relative openness can be exaggerated. In fact, by this point Sentences 
commentaries themselves had become increasingly loosely based on the 
original text, often containing long digressions into philosophical topics 
that had little bearing on Lombard’s original theological masterpiece.1 
Similarly, even though the question sets in a quodlibet were suggested 
by others (a quolibet) and were about anything (de quolibet), in practice 
masters often used the questions they received, whatever the ostensible 
subject matter, as an occasion to expound on favorite concerns and 
issues, often twisting exotic-sounding queries toward the advancement 
of  time-worn debates. Hence, while quodlibetal questions often sound 
recondite in the extreme, the quodlibeta of  the 1320s and 1330s at Oxford 
1 Chris Schabel documents this change for Sentences commentaries in this period in 
“Oxford Franciscans after Ockham: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham,” Mediaeval 
Commentaries on the Sentences of  Peter Lombard, vol. I, G.R. Evans, ed. (Leiden 2002), pp. 
359–77. More general remarks of  a similar nature are found in W.J. Courtenay, Schools 
and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton 1987), pp. 252–5.
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are not exceptional for the period, but are very much continuous in 
method, tone, and diffi culty with comparable, contemporary theologi-
cal literature.
Chronology
All else aside, it is often diffi cult to give an exact absolute date to quod-
libeta of  this period. Because fourteenth-century quodlibeta do not always 
correspond to a uniquely identifying stage or stages in a scholar’s career 
the way a Sentences lecture would,2 they are not as useful as other literary 
forms for establishing chronologies. There are exceptions, of  course, 
but in general when external evidence is lacking it can be diffi cult to 
say what the canonical ordering of  questions should be within a quod-
libetal collection, or what the absolute date of  a quodlibet is, or indeed 
where exactly a set of  quodlibetal questions fi ts in the author’s overall 
career. Most of  the arguments for establishing such facts will rely on 
internal evidence that is weak to some substantial degree. Moreover, 
since quodlibeta were sometimes revised by their authors, e.g., rewritten, 
extended, or given a more logical ordering, there is often little certainty 
regarding the date of  any particular version of  a quodlibet.
Intense Intellectual Exchange and Interdependence
Oxford quodlibeta of  this era are characterized by extremely pointed, 
detailed, directed, charge and counter-charge between contemporary 
intellectual opponents. Of  course, as records of  disputational encoun-
ters, all quodlibeta might be expected to exemplify this characteristic to 
some extent. However, the quodlibeta we will here consider (especially 
those of  Chatton and Ockham) refl ect extremely lively and occasionally 
personal attacks and rebuttals, and it seems that this feature of  quod libeta 
may even have increased from the late thirteenth to the fourteenth 
century.3 Since the Sentences commentaries at this time had themselves 
become platforms for presenting individual philosophical theories and 
for opposing contemporaries by name,4 and since a person normally 
undertook quodlibetal disputation at a later career stage than he under-
took a Sentences commentary, the quodlibeta of  this time tend to represent 
the second or even third stages of  highly contended controversies. This 
2 Glorieux II, pp. 33–6, and W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His 
Life and Writings (Leiden 1978), p. 99, n. 220.
3 Glorieux I, pp. 55–6.
4 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 254.
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makes them very diffi cult to understand in isolation; they are not very 
self-contained writings.
William of  Ockham
Ockham had a full and controversial life, and a long and fruitful writing 
career in philosophy and theology, even if  his academic and Church 
careers were dramatically truncated. His peak output of  non-political 
work came between 1317 and 1324. Several readable and reasonably 
complete short accounts of  his life have been written, and there seems 
little new data to add.5 Born around 1288 in the village of  Ockham, 
not far from London, William entered the Franciscan Order at a young 
age. Having received his basic education in language and philosophy 
at London, he began to study theology at Oxford in the fi rst few years 
after the death of  Scotus. He read the Sentences at Oxford during the 
1317–19 biennium, and by 1321 was lecturing in theology, perhaps at 
the Franciscan studium in London, where Walter Chatton and Adam 
Wodeham were as well.6 While waiting for his turn at an Oxford regency 
in 1324, he was summoned to Avignon to answer questions that had 
arisen about the orthodoxy of  his ideas on God’s power. While resident 
there he famously became entangled in a controversy between Pope 
John XXII and the Franciscan Order over their divergent approaches 
to apostolic poverty and the ownership of  property. The encounter 
ended disastrously for Ockham, who, after declaring the pope a heretic, 
escaped through Italy to German lands in the spring of  1328, where he 
fi nally settled under the protection of  the Emperor Louis of  Bavaria. 
He remained there until his death in 1347, producing a large body of  
work on political theory during these two decades.
5 The clearest, most complete short account of  Ockham’s life, writings, and intel-
lectual background are P.V. Spade’s “Introduction” and W.J. Courtenay’s “The Aca-
demic and Intellectual Worlds of  Ockham,” which form the fi rst two chapters of  The 
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, P.V. Spade, ed. (Cambridge 1999), pp. 1–29. This has 
been my main source for the biographical details I give here.
6 This is controversial. See below for further discussion.
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Ockham’s Quodlibeta
Manuscript Tradition, Attribution, Dating, and Arrangement of  Questions
The textual situation for Ockham’s Quodlibeta is excellent all around. 
Several manuscript witnesses exist, a careful critical edition has been 
prepared from them, and there is even a translation of  the entire work 
into English by Alfred Freddoso and Francis Kelley.7 The work contains 
170 questions in all, fi lling one 782-page volume of  the critical edition. 
Four full and nine partial manuscripts attest to his Quodlibeta, as well 
as three printed editions.8 There is no occasion to doubt that these 
are quodlibetal disputations, since every manuscript witness agrees in 
denominating the work as such, and since the many internal cross-
references use this same designation in referring the reader to other 
questions.9 Similar remarks apply to authorial attribution.10
Unlike the Quodlibeta of  Robert Holcot, to be examined below, there 
are no serious diffi culties concerning the ordering and grouping of  the 
questions in the collection: the majority of  all manuscript witnesses and 
printed editions contain the order of  questions that is followed in the 
modern critical edition. A second tradition of  ordering does exist, but it 
does not square with the internal and external evidence from Ockham’s 
own cross-references, and at any rate the witnesses containing this sec-
ond ordering show signs of  some later editorial rearrangement.11
If  these issues are moot for Ockham’s quodlibetal collection, the 
issue of  fontes and of  the occasion for its composition and redaction 
are quite fertile and important for Ockham scholarship. For Ockham 
was never a master, at Oxford or elsewhere, but quodlibetal disputa-
tions were customarily recorded and circulated only for the magisterial 
participants who fi nally determined the questions de quolibet. Why then 
this rather large collection, widely circulated and copied as though of  
quodlibetal determinationes? Where and why were these questions dis-
puted, recorded, and edited?
 7 William of  Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions, 2 vols. bound as one, trans. A. Freddoso 
and F.E. Kelley (New Haven 1998).
 8 The primary manuscript witnesses are, using Wey’s sigla: (1) A = Paris, BnF 
lat. 16398; (2) B = BAV, Vat. lat. 3075; (3) C = BAV, Vat. lat. 956; (4) D = Giessen, 
Universitätsbibliothek, 733. See the introduction to Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibeta 
Septem, ed. J.C. Wey, Opera Theologica IX (St Bonaventure, NY 1980), pp. 1*–22*.
 9 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 26*.
10 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 32*–4*.
11 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 23*.
SCHABEL_F16_650-692.indd   655 7/19/2007   8:51:16 PM
656 rondo keele
The standard answer to these questions has its roots in Gedeon Gal’s 
discussion of  Ockham’s Summa Logicae.12 Gal suggested that Ockham 
composed his Summa in London, not Oxford, because Walter Chatton 
and Adam Wodeham were in the same physical location as Ockham 
during its composition, and Chatton was defi nitely in London. Add to 
this “London hypothesis” the fact that Ockham’s Quodlibeta were dis-
puted in this same time period (see below), and that Chatton’s infl uence 
is similarly evident in the Quodlibeta, and we reach the conclusion that 
Ockham disputed his Quodlibeta and wrote at least some of  them down 
in London. But the persuasive power of  the London hypothesis itself  
has recently been criticized by Courtenay as exceeding the strength of  
the evidence.13 Since it bears on our understanding of  the Quodlibeta, 
some discussion of  this controversy is in order here.
Before turning to the controversy, we should say what seems fairly fi rm 
and clear about the place and time of  Ockham’s Quodlibeta. Although 
he is named only once, in Quodlibet I, q. 2, Walter Chatton and his 
arguments are without doubt the overwhelming target of  Ockham’s 
attacks in an enormous number of  questions. Wey fi nds Ockham 
quoting or paraphrasing passages from Chatton’s Reportatio in no less 
than sixty-eight of  the 170 questions therein, and admits that there 
are probably others that he missed.14 Nor are Chatton’s ideas always 
selected for criticism; sometimes they are agreed with or even used to 
solve problems.15 Wey presents several reasons to believe that Chatton 
may have presented viva voce some of  the arguments to which Ockham 
responds.16 Moreover, careful attention to the details of  mutual quotation 
between Ockham and Chatton, as well as external evidence, suggests 
that all these Quodlibeta, or at least the later ones, may have been written 
down in Avignon, and that almost certainly Ockham completed some 
of  the redactions there.17
So much seems clear. But Wey combined these observations on the 
Quodlibeta with Gal’s London hypothesis on the Summa logicae to yield 
12 From the introduction to Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. G. Gal, Opera 
Philosophica I (St Bonaventure, NY 1967), pp. 53*–6*.
13 W.J. Courtenay, “Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium: Observation on 
Recent Changes to Ockham’s Biography,” Gegenwart Ockhams, W. Vossenkuhl and R. 
Schönberger, eds. (Weinheim 1990), pp. 327–37.
14 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 27*.
15 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 27*.
16 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 39*.
17 Wey, introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 41*.
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the conclusion that, though they may have been composed in Avignon, 
Ockham’s Quodlibeta are all the fruit of  disputations held in London 
between 1322 and 1324.18 On this version of  events, Chatton, Ockham, 
and their confrere Adam Wodeham were all living in a Franciscan 
house in London during the opening years of  the 1320s, engaging in 
a rapid-fi re exchange of  views, with Ockham involved in quodlibetal 
disputations later written down.
Wey explains how there came to be seven Quodlibeta in just two 
years by postulating a system of  three academic terms in the studia, 
including London, with disputations occurring each term, rather than 
on the university schedule of  twice per year at Lent and Advent. This 
allows for three disputations to take place in a given academic cycle. 
Then, observing the tight connections between Ockham’s Quodlibet I 
and Chatton’s Reportatio book II, dated late in 1322, Wey distributes the 
remainder of  Ockham’s disputations very sensibly as follows:
1322 Autumn: Quodlibet I
1323 Winter: Quodlibet II
1323 Spring: Quodlibet III
1323 Autumn: Quodlibet IV
1324 Winter and Spring: Quodlibeta V–VII
But even if  the “Chatton connection” on which this is based is quite 
clear, why believe the London hypothesis? The evidence rests fundamen-
tally on two lines of  argument. (1) Gal’s introduction to Summa logicae 
famously argues that Ockham, Wodeham, and Chatton were together 
in whatever time and place Chatton’s Reportatio was composed.19 This 
claim has received nothing but support from subsequent examinations 
of  texts.20 (2) Gal argued in that same place that Chatton’s Reportatio 
18 Wey argues that the leisurely style of  the writing refl ects only the mode of  
composition, when he had so little to do his fi rst year in Avignon, but this style belies 
the deeper intensity of  the actual exchanges that form the basis of  the work. Wey, 
introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 38* and 41*.
19 Gal’s introduction to Ockham, Summa logicae, p. 54*. His memorable phrasing is 
ubi Chatton, ibi Wodeham; ubi Wodeham, ibi Ockham.
20 For example, we know that before Ockham left for Avignon, Wodeham showed 
him a reportatio of  Chatton’s Sentences lectures, taken in Wodeham’s own hand, and 
that Ockham scribbled at least one response to Chatton’s arguments in the margins 
of  Wodeham’s own book (“manu sua in margine reportationis meae”); Courtenay, 
Adam Wodeham, p. 71n., and p. 162. This manuscript is lost, sadly. The intensity seems 
to have carried over to Chatton’s later works as well. Stephen F. Brown argued from 
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was composed in London in 1321–23. The temporal portion of  this 
second claim rings true; there is good evidence that Chatton’s Reportatio 
lectures occurred across the biennium 1321–23 or at the very least the 
lectures on book III occurred in 1323.21 But the argument that the 
Reportatio was composed in London is much weaker. The argument is 
just this: Chatton refers to the villa of  Oxford in his Reportatio in a way 
that suggests he was outside its walls as he wrote it; but if  not Oxford, 
then London Greyfriars is the next most likely studium to host such a 
lecture. Now London is a good guess, of  course, and no better guesses 
have suggested themselves, but it must be admitted that the case is 
weak. Courtenay has even constructed an alternative hypothesis in 
which Chatton’s reference to the villa of  Oxford as if  he were outside 
might simply refl ect the fact that the Franciscan studium at Oxford is 
literally outside (although not far outside) the villa itself, as defi ned by 
the town walls.22
The consequences of  this weakness for our understanding of  Ock-
ham’s Quodlibeta are just these. If  we set the London hypothesis aside as 
conjecture, the only other evidence for London as the site of  disputation 
for Ockham’s Quodlibeta is also weak: the ABC family of  codices twice 
mention London in philosophical examples. Moreover, a recent paper 
by Girard Etzkorn has given two arguments for the idea that Quodlibeta 
VI and VII must have been composed in Avignon itself, rendering any 
textual evidence in Chatton’s Prologus and Lectura and in Ockham’s Quodlibeta septem and 
Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis that these two men were exchanging written 
copies of  their arguments and rebuttals with such rapidity that we see mutual verbatim 
quoting between parallel passages of  text. S.F. Brown, “Walter Chatton’s Lectura and 
William of  Ockham’s Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. 
Wolter, W.A. Frank and G.J. Etzkorn, eds. (St Bonaventure, NY 1985), pp. 82–115. 
21 The evidence can be summarized as follows. Chatton’s Reportatio III mentions 
the constitution Ad conditionem canonum, dated December 1322, as a recent document; 
thus we have a terminus post quem. Chatton did not mention the constitution Cum inter 
nonnullos, dated November 1323, and, to bolster this argument from silence, we know 
that Wodeham audited these lectures and passed his copies along to Ockham, who 
had left England for good by summer 1324; thus we have a fi rm terminus ante quem of  
1324. This all suggests that Chatton began lecturing on book III early in 1323, and so 
possibly on books I and II in the calendar year 1322, and his prologue in 1321. See 
Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, p. 38*, and Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 69–71. For an 
alternative view see R. Wood, “Introduction,” in Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda 
in librum primum Sententiarum, eds. R. Wood and G. Gal (St. Bonaventure, NY 1990), 
pp. 12–13.
22 Courtenay, “Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium,” pp. 333–4.
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“London versus Oxford” discussion moot.23 (1) Although Quodlibeta 
I–V were plausibly debated in England, Quodlibeta VI and VII contain 
verbatim quotations from some of  the Avignon commission’s objections 
to Ockham’s ideas on absolute power, suggesting these debates both 
postdate his May 1324 departure for Avignon; Wey’s chronology has 
these debates fi nished and in England by spring of  1324. (2) Ockham 
was called to defend his views on relations at a Franciscan provincial 
chapter held in Cambridge, possibly in the spring of  1323, and so the 
material on relations in Quodlibeta VI and VII could be construed as a 
response to this commission, rather than as records of  actual quodli-
betal disputations in London. This too suggests dating later than May 
1324, and so a debate-location entirely outside England, and it certainly 
confl icts with the London hypothesis.24 Moreover, Etzkorn’s alternative 
suggestion relieves the pressure of  Wey’s somewhat cramped arrange-
ment of  seven Quodlibeta being debated in just two years.
It seems we must admit that we cannot be very certain about where 
these debates took place, especially the later ones. However, even if  
the evidence for the standard picture is thereby seriously fl awed, we 
know that the majority of  the disputations were held in England, that 
they show intense infl uence by Chatton, and that they were not likely 
overlong in composition as a written work, despite their sheer range 
and size. As such they provide us only a snapshot of  Ockham’s thought, 
although a useful one; these are his mature views on important issues, 
as refi ned through intense debate with Franciscan colleagues.25
Content
Ockham’s seven Quodlibeta, collected today under the title Quodlibeta 
septem, cover a great deal of  intellectual ground. One does get the 
impression from the frequency of  certain topics that Ockham was 
pressed in his disputations on just those issues where he was especially 
innovative and provocative, for example, on the unreality of  respective 
entities in creatures and his reduction of  the other accidental categories 
besides quality (I.18; IV.11, 18–28; V.21–23; VI.8–30; VII.1–8, 19), 
his idiosyncratic development and applications of  termist logic (II.19; 
23 G. Etzkorn, “Ockham at Avignon: His Response to Critics,” Franciscan Studies 59 
(2001), pp. 9–19.
24 Wey did not know about this Cambridge provincial chapter. See Etzkorn, “Ock-
ham at Avignon,” p. 16, n. 30.
25 Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, pp. 27*–8* and 32*.
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III.12–13; IV.12, 35; V.8–9, 14–20, 24–25; VII.10), his ideas on the soul 
and cognition, especially intuitive cognition (I.6–7, 10–16; II.10–13, 15, 
17–18; III.8, 17, 20–22; IV.9, 13–16; V.5; VI.6), and to a lesser degree, 
on the interior act alone being sin and right reason as a partial object 
of  moral acts (I.20; III.14–16).
Ockham’s Quodlibeta provide several exceptional examples of  the 
intricacy of  argumentation and the intensity of  exchange in fourteenth-
century English quodlibetal literature, in this case between Ockham 
and Walter Chatton. To illustrate this point I wish to discuss Quodlibet 
I, q. 5, in some detail. There Ockham develops a counter-example to 
Chatton’s favorite semantic principle, which is sometimes dubbed the 
“anti-razor,” but which I shall refer to as “the Chatton Principle.”26 
In I.5 Ockham contends that the Chatton Principle (explained below) 
is inapplicable to propositions that contain negation virtually, or that 
have a negative exponent when exposited. If  true, this would mean that 
Chatton’s favorite argument in favor of  a realist account of  motion, and 
his favorite proof  of  respective entities (roughly, relations), could not work. 
After a brief  description the Chatton Principle, we can see concretely 
the near impossibility of  understanding Ockham’s Quodlibeta aright 
without having Chatton’s texts in hand.
Here is one general formulation of  the Chatton Principle from his 
Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4:
Consider an affi rmative proposition, which, when it is verifi ed, is verifi ed 
only for things; if  three things do not suffi ce for verifying it, one has to 
posit a fourth, and so on in turn [for four things, or fi ve, etc.].27
Chatton gives other versions in several places. However, the basic 
idea is the same in each case: we must admit that there are as many 
things as are required to make a certain proposition true. Some have 
for this reason called the principle an “anti-razor.” Chatton eventu-
ally28 makes it clear that contradiction is the standard by which we judge 
26 For some general scholarly discussion of  the anti-razor, see A. Maurer, “Method in 
Ockham’s Nominalism,” The Monist 61,3 (1978), pp. 426–443; A. Maurer, “Ockham’s 
Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor,” Mediaeval Studies 46 (1984), pp. 426–43; and R. Keele, 
Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century: The Chatton Principle and Ockham’s Razor (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Indiana University, 2002).
27 Walter Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, in Reportatio super Sententias: Liber I, distinc-
tiones 10–48, eds. J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn (Toronto 2002), p. 237, par. 57: “Propositio 
affi rmativa, quae quando verifi catur, solum verifi catur pro rebus; si tres non suffi ciunt 
ad verifi candum eam, oportet ponere quartam, et sic deinceps.”
28 Viz., in Lectura I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.
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what is required to make a proposition true: n things are enough to 
make a (true) proposition true when it is a contradiction that these n 
things exist as indicated by the proposition, and yet the proposition is 
false. In a sense, we must “add” to our ontology enough entities of  
the appropriate types so that it is impossible that propositions that are 
in fact true would be false, if  those entities existed. The underlying 
assumption here is that if  an existent makes a difference to truth then 
it must be a thing (= res). The basis of  this assumption can be found 
in Aristotle29 and Scotus,30 who claim that a transition from contradic-
tory to contradictory is a change. But since according to Aristotle all 
change takes place in a real subject, the previous claim about change 
seems to have been interpreted by Chatton to mean that there can be 
no passage from contradictory state to contradictory state without the 
generation or corruption of  some thing (res). In this form the assumption 
might usefully be called the “Principle of  Contradictories.” Ockham, 
of  course, would vigorously oppose this very semantic assumption and 
offer various alternatives to replace or supplement it, for example, his 
connotation theory.
Chatton applied his Principle, clearly related in some way to the 
razor, to prove that certain respective accidents exist, in particular those 
associated with causality, for example, production, and also that certain 
successive accidents exist, such as motion. Chatton’s account of  motion 
says that, in the instant a thing begins to move, it acquires a real thing 
(res), which we could call motion, which thing is a successive accident 
inhering in the permanent moving object. When the object ceases to 
move it loses this accident.31 The need to posit such an entity follows 
from the Chatton Principle: without positing such an entity no true 
sentence of  the form ‘X is in motion’ could be true, and, when motion 
is posited in a permanent substance X, it is indeed a contradiction that 
‘X is in motion’ is false.
Ockham, of  course, did not accept such an account of  motion, 
because he did not accept the existence of  a special class of  successive 
entities.32 Hence, for him, motion is simply a term, and a connotative 
29 For example, in Physics V.1 (225a 1–20).
30 For example, in Ordinatio 1, d. 30, qq. 1–2, ed. C. Balic, Opera Omnia VI (Vatican 
City 1963), p. 186, l. 20–1.
31 For example in Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 4, ed. Wey-Etzkorn, p. 235, 
parr. 45–6.
32 He argues this point in many places, for example, Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aris-
totelis, ed. S.F. Brown, Opera Philosophica VI (St Bonaventure, NY 1984) qq. 13 and 17.
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one, primarily signifying a moving object and secondarily signifying that 
this object exists in the following manner: (1) successively in different 
places, (2) without intervening rest, and (3) continuously.33 Hence ‘X is 
in motion’ simply means that ‘X successively coexists in different places 
without intervening rest, continuously’.
The primary issue in Ockham’s Quodlibet I, q. 5, is whether an angel 
can move locally. To answer the question, Ockham gives the account 
of  motion mentioned above, but then considers an objection based 
on a Chattonian realist account of  motion supported by the Chatton 
Principle, which he quotes explicitly. Ockham raises this Chattonian 
objection and engages in imaginary debate with it along these lines: the 
Chatton Principle claims that we need to posit, in the case of  angelic 
motion, the acquisition of  a successive accident that the angel previously 
lacked, while Ockham says that such an accident is not needed, but that 
we need only posit an angel as a movable thing that will be in a different 
place than he is in now (successively, continuously, without interven-
ing rest). To settle the issue Ockham goes after the Chatton Principle 
directly with a counter-example. Ockham explains it this way:
To the fi rst of  these arguments I reply that the principle on which this 
argument is founded [viz., the Chatton Principle] is false unless it is more 
adequately interpreted, since with respect to the truth of  a given proposi-
tion, in some cases two things are suffi cient at one time, and in some cases 
two things are not suffi cient, say, at another time. An example: suppose 
that God creates an angel in the absence of  all motion and time, and that 
the proposition ‘This angel is being created’ is written down in a book. In 
that case, in the beginning, when the angel is being created, three things 
are suffi cient to make the proposition ‘This angel is being created by God’ 
true—viz., God, the angel, and the book inscribed with such a proposition. 
But afterwards, if  exactly the same things exist, neither those things nor 
any other things are suffi cient to make that proposition true.34
It is not at all obvious exactly what Ockham has in mind unless one 
understands Chatton’s views, and indeed the shift to talk of  creating 
angels in a question about the motion of  angels would otherwise be 
baffl ing. But if  we recall that the substantive issue overall is whether or 
33 This kind of  account occurs, for example, in Quodlibet I, q. 5, but in other places 
as well. Ockham adds the third clause to account for a case where God would destroy 
X, then create it again in another place; this would fi t (1) and (2), but no one would 
call it local motion.
34 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 30. I have added the 
material in brackets.
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not the Principle of  Contradictories needs to be expanded to include a 
variety of  ways for sentences to change truth value, it becomes easier 
to see his basic strategy. This counter-example tries to show that there 
is a proposition p, such that p changes from contradictory to contradic-
tory (in this case it goes from being true to being false), and that this 
change occurs even though exactly the same number n of  things a, b, 
c, . . . exist when it is true and when it is false. If  this were the case, 
Chatton would have to admit that there was a change in truth value 
without a change in the number of  res in the world, and hence that 
the Principle of  Contradictories would need to be expanded to include 
other ways for propositions to become true or false.
To prove his case Ockham simply claims to exhibit a p that fi ts the 
description above. To see how the example works, let p = ‘This angel 
is being created by God’, let a = God, b = an angel, c = the book 
inscribed with the proposition. (The book itself  plays no integral role 
here; it is just that according to Ockham, only proposition tokens exist, 
and in order to be actually true or false a proposition must be actual; 
hence, we need the thing written down somewhere.) The problem then 
seems to be as follows. Let nothing exist save for God, then imagine that 
God creates an angel at time t1. In this case, according to the Chatton 
Principle, ‘This angel is being created by God’ would be made true at 
t1 by the existence of  three distinct res, viz., God, the angel, and the 
proposition in the book. But notice that at any time subsequent to t1, 
say, t2, the proposition ‘This angel is being created by God’ will be 
false, even if  the same three res, God, the angel, and the proposition 
in the book, still exist. Why will ‘This angel is being created by God’ 
be false at t2? The idea seems to be that any created being has a fi rst 
instant of  existence, and it is only in that fi rst instant of  existence that 
a thing can be said to be “being created.” Therefore, since the instant 
in which the angel is being created was posited to be t1, and since t2 is 
distinct from t1, it must be the case that the angel is not being created 
at t2; rather, at t2 the angel already is. But then ‘This angel is being 
created by God’ is clearly false at t2, even though the very same three 
items (viz., God, the angel, and the proposition in the book) exist at t2 
as did at t1 when ‘This angel is being created by God’ was true.
To put the matter succinctly, if  Chatton were correct, something 
would have to have gone out of  existence at t2 in order for ‘This angel 
is being created by God’ to be false then when it was true before, but 
apparently the same three things exist at t2 as existed before. In gen-
eral, according to this kind of  example, something else besides a res 
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must account for p’s passage from truth to falsity, i.e., p’s passage from 
contradictory to contradictory, and so the Principle of  Contradictories 
must be expanded.
Another way to see the problem Ockham is raising in I.5 is to consider 
how he would exposit a proposition like ‘This angel is being created by 
God’. For him, analogously with the case of  motion discussed above, the 
proposition means something like ‘The angel now exists and before this 
he did not exist, and God brought this situation about’. In essence this 
is simply to deny necessary being to the created thing, which is after all 
what ‘being created’ means. But by this analysis obviously ‘This angel 
is being created by God’ is false at t2, since at t2 it is not the case that 
before t2 the angel did not exist; ex hypothesi the angel existed at t1, the 
fi rst moment of  its existence, and t1 is before t2.
Ockham considers two Chatton-style objections to his counter-
example in turn and then attempts to modify the same basic strategy 
to handle each of  the objections. Notice that, given Ockham’s example 
and Chatton’s Principle, any useful Chattonian objection must either 
(1) deny that p goes from being true to being false, or else (2) it must 
hold that not three things a, b, and c but rather, say, four things a, b, 
c, and d are required to make p true in the fi rst place, and that in fact 
it is the non-existence of  d at t2 that makes p false at that time. Both 
the Chatton-style objections that Ockham attempts to rebut take the 
second approach. The fi rst such objection I will pass over, and I will 
instead look only at the second objection, and then explain Ockham’s 
rebuttal to it.
Ockham describes the Chattonian objection thus: “You might object 
further that a passive creation is required for the truth of  this proposi-
tion.”35 By itself, this is quite cryptic, and would be almost impossible 
to understand if  one did not know that the “you” addressed but not 
named is Walter Chatton, and what the Chatton Principle is about. 
Because we know this we can make sense of  the passage: Chatton could 
say that God, the angel, and the book are not suffi cient to make ‘This 
angel is being created by God’ true in the fi rst place, and that a fourth 
35 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 31. Unfortunately, I know 
of  no passage where Chatton makes this actual objection, so I cannot say whether 
it is real or imagined. That the objection is Chattonian in style is indubitable. If  
Ockham and Chatton were living and working at the Franciscan studium in London 
(see above), it is possible that the objection was raised by Chatton himself  in person 
at this disputation.
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thing is also needed, namely, a passive respective entity of  creation, which 
thing is a respective accident inhering in the angel as a foundation.36 
This passive accident would inhere in the angel while God created him, 
i.e., at the fi rst moment of  his existence (= t1), but not afterward, e.g., 
not at t2. Hence, the Chattonian response would go, the reason why 
‘This angel is being created by God’ is true at t1 but false at t2 is that 
at t1 these four things exist—viz., God, the angel, the book, and the 
passive respective of  creation in the angel—but at t2 only three things 
exist—viz., God, the angel, and the book. But then it is in fact the 
generation or corruption of  some thing, namely, the passive respective 
accident, which causes the proposition ‘This angel is being created by 
God’ to be at fi rst true and then later false.
Ockham’s reply to this Chatton-style objection is essentially to say 
that we do not evade the diffi culty even if  the passive respective of  cre-
ation be granted, since God by his absolute power could miraculously 
conserve that passive respective accident of  creation in the angel at t2, 
in which case, again, the same four things exist now that the proposi-
tion is false as existed when it was true, viz., at t1. Ockham explains 
his reply as follows:
This [Chattonian objection] does not help, since God can conserve that 
passive creation, and the argument stands as before: The proposition will 
fi rst be true, since it was true to say that the angel now exists and before 
this did not exist; and afterwards it will be false, since . . . the proposition 
‘The angel now exists and before this he did not exist’ will be false, despite 
the fact that the passive creation remains in existence. Therefore I claim 
that if  [the Chatton Principle] has truth, then it has truth only when the 
relevant proposition is such that, like ‘A human being is an animal’, ‘A 
human being is white’, etc., it is not negative and does not include any 
negative proposition as an exponent.37
And indeed, Ockham can generalize this strategy to account for any 
other entities Chatton would posit to try to evade the problem; for any 
proposition p, and number of  entities n, Ockham’s strategy would seem 
to show that even if  Chatton posits an n + 1th entity whose non-exis-
tence at t2 would explain why p is false at t2, it remains that God can 
36 There is no corresponding accident in God, of  course, who has no accidental 
properties at all. But this has no bearing on the issue at hand.
37 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Freddoso-Kelley, p. 31. I have modifi ed the 
translation slightly and added the material in brackets.
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conserve that n + 1th entity through his absolute power into instant t2, 
so that this entity’s absence cannot explain the falsehood of  p at t2.
I pass over a discussion of  whether or not Ockham’s response is 
adequate.38 The point is that this material is nearly unintelligible in 
much of  its argumentative detail without an adequate knowledge of  
the work of  Walter Chatton.
Walter Chatton
Walter Chatton’s name is well known to many specialists on fourteenth-
century theology and philosophy and especially to specialists on Ock-
ham. However, even to most of  them, the details of  his views are only 
now emerging, as his Sentences commentaries begin to be published in 
full in critical editions. Although Chatton’s career was described two 
decades ago in respectable detail by William Courtenay, there is some 
new information and evidence to add. I begin with a sketch of  Chatton’s 
career based on those few hard facts and dates we do possess.
It seems best to break up Chatton’s life and career into four 
stages.39
38 I think it is demonstrably inadequate in fact. Chatton did also, raising an interest-
ing line of  against it in his Lectura 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, and I think a still more conclusive 
refutation is possible. See R. Keele, Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century, Chapter 8.
39 To yield a more readable account of  Chatton’s life, I shall save for the footnotes 
my discussions of  the controversial elements of  this biography. Little corroborated evi-
dence exists for many of  these claims, and in general, the more detailed any particular 
claim is the more agnosticism is warranted. My primary source for this initial sketch, 
and still the best overall discussion of  Chatton’s life, is Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 
pp. 66–74. Other sources consulted, in descending order of  their useful biographical 
content, include: Keele, Formal Ontology in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 9–15; A.B. Emden, 
A Biographical Register of  the University of  Oxford to A.D. 1500 I (Oxford 1957), pp. 395–6; 
H.G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of  Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335 (Ph.
D. Dissertation, University of  Wisconsin-Madison, 1974), pp. 185–205; Brown, “Walter 
Chatton’s Lectura,” pp. 82–115; L. Baudry, “Gauthier de Chatton et son commentaire 
des Sentences,” AHDLMA 14 (1943–45), pp. 337–69; C.K. Brampton, “Gauthier 
de Chatton et la provenance des mss. lat. Paris Bibl. Nat. 15886 et 15887,” Études 
Franciscaines 14 (1964), pp. 200–5; P.E. Longpré, “Gualtiero di Catton: Un Maestro 
Francescano D’Oxford,” Studi Francescani 9 (1923), pp. 101–14; and D.L. Douie, “Three 
treatises on Evangelical Poverty,” AFH 24 (1931), pp. 341–69, continued in 25 (1932), 
pp. 36–58, 210–40.
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Childhood, Ordination, and Philosophical Training (Birth to 1315)
Passing over the question of  the exact year, we can say with some 
confi dence that Walter Chatton was born between 1285 and 1290 in 
the small village of  Chatton, just west of  Durham.40 He entered the 
Franciscan Order as a puer, i.e., before the age of  fourteen, and was 
ordained a subdeacon on 20 May 1307. He very likely received his 
philosophical training in the North and professed there as well, perhaps 
at the convent in Carlisle.
Early Bachelor of  Theology Studies (1315 to 1321)
Ample evidence suggests that during this period Chatton was training 
in theology and interacting with Ockham and Wodeham. We know 
that he was outspoken even from this stage against Ockham on many 
issues, and against the views of  Campsall, especially on the logic of  
the Trinity.41
Advanced Bachelor Studies and Regency (1321 to 1333)
We have the least amount of  hard biographical data for this period, 
although it is clearly the most interesting and intense intellectual period 
of  his life. Textual evidence allows us to argue with varying degrees of  
certainty that four of  his fi ve extant works—Reportatio, Lectura (which 
includes the separately edited Collatio et Prologus), Quodlibet, De paupertate 
evangelica, and Sermo de visione beatifi ca—were written during this period.42 
We have long possessed reasonable dates (although they are wide, in 
one case) for the fi rst two of  these works: he probably delivered his 
Reportatio during the biennium 1321–23,43 and his Lectura must have 
40 The date we give to Chatton’s birth depends upon to which stage of  his career 
his Reportatio corresponds.
41 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 60 and 69.
42 The exception is Sermo de visione beatifi ca, which was likely written in Avignon 
in 1333, and so belongs to the next stage; see M. Dykmans, “Les Frères Mineurs 
d’Avignon au début de 1333 et le sermon de Gautier de Chatton sur la vision béati-
fi que,” AHDLMA 78 (1971), pp. 105–48. For the dating of  De paupertate evangelica see 
Douie, “Three treatises on Evangelical Poverty,” p. 345. The list of  Chatton’s works 
was compiled from R. Sharpe, A Handlist of  Latin Writers of  Great Britain and Ireland Before 
1540 (2nd edition, Turnout 2001), pp. 730–1; N.A. Fitzpatrick, “Walter Chatton on 
the Univocity of  Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham,” Franciscan 
Studies 31 (1971), pp. 88–177; and Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: 
Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. J.C. Wey (Toronto 1989), pp. 1–2. The Reportatio 
in Sententias, eds. J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 4 vols. (Toronto 2002–2005), has appeared, 
and the Lectura will be published shortly.
43 See p. 000 above for some qualifi cations.
SCHABEL_F16_650-692.indd   667 7/19/2007   8:51:18 PM
668 rondo keele
been written between 1324 and 1330.44 The fi rst three works listed 
above are of  primary philosophical importance in his corpus. During 
this period Chatton also incepted as a regent master, probably in the 
academic year 1329–30.45
Later career in Avignon and death (1333 to 1343/44)
Chatton is known to have been in Avignon on 17 January 1333. He 
was summoned there in order to participate in hearings against Thomas 
Waleys, and eventually served as an advisor to Pope Benedict XII, a 
post he held for several years. After this we know little of  him save for 
two events, one uncommon, the other most common: fi rst, in a career-
halting accident in 1343, he was appointed bishop of  the Welsh see of  
Asaph although the position was not really vacant, and second, he died 
the next winter at Avignon, in late 1343 or perhaps early 1344.46
Chatton’s Quodlibet
The positive identifi cation of  Chatton’s Quodlibet was announced in 1987 
by Girard Etzkorn, but it turns out that the lone manuscript containing 
it was recognized as Chattonian by two previous scholars, Antonius 
Samaritani, who edited question 3, on the immaculate conception, and 
earlier still by Carlo Balic.47 However, Etzkorn went further than the 
44 The Lectura dates are based on the mention of  Ockham’s Summa logicae, which 
gives a terminus post quem of  1324; Wodeham’s citation in 1330 of  Lectura material gives 
a terminus ante quem of  1330. Below I give reasons to suppose that the relative date of  
Chatton’s Lectura is earlier than his Quodlibet. All my arguments about the date of  the 
Quodlibet itself  are consistent with the wide dating of  the Lectura just mentioned.
45 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 67. Courtenay cites the Oxford Historical Society’s 
Munimenta Civitatis Oxonie as his source. Emden cites this same source as evidence that 
Chatton was in Oxford in the spring of  1330, involved on the side of  the Franciscan 
Order in a court case.
46 Three areas in which scholars have attempted to determine his life and career 
in more detail have been more controversial, viz., (1) his exact birth year, (2) to which 
career stage his Reportatio belongs—bachelor lectures or preparation for bachelor lec-
tures, and (3) the location of  the Reportatio’s composition. Clearly answers to (2) and 
(3) bear on each other, but also will bear on the answer to (1), since answers to (2) 
and (3) suggest to us how old Chatton might have been around 1321–23, the fi rm 
dates of  the Reportatio.
47 G.J. Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” AFH 80 (1987), pp. 321–33; 
A. Samaritani, “De beatae Mariae Virginis immaculata conceptione quodlibet XIII–XIV 
saec. primum edita,” Marian Library Studies 5 (1973) (pp. 729–835), pp. 792–8; and 
C. Balic, Ioannis de Polliaco et Ioannis de Neapoli Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione 
Beatae Mariae Virginis, (Sibenici, Yugoslavia 1931), p. xlvii, n. 62.
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others in giving arguments (to be discussed below) which support the 
identifi cation of  the work in question as a quodlibet, and which strongly 
corroborate the claim that the author of  the Quodlibet was Walter Chat-
ton. Etzkorn eventually undertook a critical edition of  the entire work, 
but because the full edition is not yet published, there is no account 
in print of  the complete case for attribution of  this work to Chatton, 
its dating, importance, philosophical content or connection to other 
Chattonian works. Therefore all these tasks must be undertaken in 
some detail here.
The Manuscript, Authenticity and Nature of  the Work
Chatton’s Quodlibet is known through a single manuscript, bound with 
a miscellany of  texts, including other quodlibeta, in Codex Paris, BnF 
lat. 15805.48 Chatton’s text is in the fourth of  six sections of  the codex, 
and runs across ff. 54ra–60rb. The manuscript yields a fairly coherent 
text, requiring relatively little emendation to achieve consistency and 
intelligibility. In the absence of  another witness, little more can currently 
be said about the accuracy of  the manuscript. Twenty-nine questions 
are presented, although the 29th question, the last of  four on future 
contingents, ends abruptly and incompletely after a few hundred words; 
however, it is unlikely that this represents a large loss of  material. The 
list of  questions, a rough translation, and their manuscript locations, 
are as follows:
1. Utrum causalitas causae fi nalis sit realis (f. 54ra) [Whether the causality of  
fi nal causes is real].
2. Utrum circumstantia aggravans peccatum aggravet illud contra aliquod 
praeceptorum (54rb) [Whether a circumstance increasing the gravity of  a 
sin does so in opposition to any of  the precepts].
3. Utrum beata Virgo potuit fuisse concepta in originali peccato (54rb) 
[Whether the Blessed Virgin could have been conceived in original sin].
4. Utrum ignorantia invincibilis excuset peccatum (54va) [Whether invincible 
ignorance excuses sin].
5. Utrum fortitudo politica sit moderativa timoris et audaciae in sensitiva 
(55ra) [Whether political courage is a quality capable of  moderating fear 
and recklessness in the sensitive appetite].
6. Utrum in moralibus ex circumstantia excusetur culpa (55ra) [Whether in 
moral matters fault is excused on account of  circumstances].
48 The manuscript details and the question list below are taken from Etzkorn, “The 
Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805.”
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 7. Utrum ignorantia invincibilis totaliter excuset (55rb) [Whether invincible 
ignorance totally excuses sin].
 8. Utrum gratia creata in anima Christi sit infinita intensive sic quod 
improportionaliter excedat quamcumque gratiam purae creaturae (55vb) 
[Whether the created grace in the soul of  Christ is intensively infi nite in 
such a way that it exceeds by all proportion any grace existing in a mere 
creature].
 9. Quattuor sunt tacta a quodam doctore contra quem volo arguere (55vb) 
[Four points, touched on by a certain doctor, against whom I want to argue 
here. The issues are conceptually unrelated, and occur in four different articles].
10. Utrum de naturis diversis in Christo debeat concedi communicatio 
in abstractis (55vb) [Whether it ought to be conceded that, in Christ, 
there was some communication between the diverse natures, considered 
abstractly].
11. Utrum lex praecipiens hominem occidi sit licita in quocumque casu 
(56ra) [Whether a law commanding that a man be killed is licit in any 
circumstances whatsoever].
12. Utrum fi nis sit obiectum actus moralis (56ra) [Whether an end is an object 
of  a moral action].
13. Utrum aliquis habitus pertinens ad prudentiam possit generari ex actibus, 
voluntate contrarium eligente (56rb) [Whether some habit pertaining to 
prudence can be generated by acts of  the will when the will itself  wills 
contrary to prudence].
14. Utrum omnis aggravatio culpae sit nata contrariare rectae conscientiae 
(56vb) [Whether every aggravation of  fault is brought about contrary to 
good conscience].
15. Utrum omnis circumstantia aggravans peccatum aggravet illud mortaliter 
vel venialiter (57ra) [Whether every circumstance increasing the gravity 
of  a sin does so either mortally or venially].
16. Utrum solus malus actus interior sit peccatum (57rb) [Whether only an 
interior wicked action counts as sin].
17. Utrum sit magis meritorium diligere amicum quam inimicum (57va) 
[Whether it is more meritorious to love a friend than an enemy].
18. Utrum purus homo magis teneatur diligere humanitatem Christi quam 
se ipsum (57va) [Whether a mere human being can be held to love the 
humanity of  Christ more than Christ himself ].
19. Utrum Abraham credidit illud praeceptum esse iustum quo praecipiebatur 
immolare fi lium suum (57va) [Whether Abraham believed that percept to 
be just by which he was commanded to sacrifi ce his own son].
20. Utrum praecipiens alicui percutere clericum et non intendens praecipere 
nisi de levi percussione et alius excedat et graviter percutiat, utrum talis 
praecipiens possit absolvi a suo episcopo diocesano (57vb) [Suppose that 
someone orders a clerk to be beaten, and intends that he be struck only 
lightly, but that the man doing the beating exceeds this intent and hits 
him much harder. Can the man giving the order be absolved of  fault by 
the bishop of  his own diocese?].
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21. Utrum ad salvandum fi dem de Trinitate sit necessarium recurrere ad 
terminos reduplicativos (58ra) [Whether it is necessary to have recourse 
to reduplicative terms for the sake of  saving our faith in the Trinity].
22. Utrum quantitas de genere quantitatis sit res distincta realiter a substantia 
et qualitatibus (58ra) [Whether a quantity in the category of  quantity is 
a thing really distinct from substance and quality].
23. Utrum Deus possit facere aliquam creaturam cui repugnet exsistere sine 
omni creatura a se totaliter distincta (58va) [Whether God can make a 
creature whose nature opposes its existence in the absence of  all other 
creatures totally distinct from it].
24. Utrum angelus sit visibilis in propria forma (59ra) [Whether an angel is 
visible in its proper form].
25. Utrum angelus potuit peccare in primo instanti sui esse (59rb) [Whether 
an angel could have sinned in the fi rst instant of  its existence].
26. Utrum angeli superiores possunt revelare inferioribus futura contingentia 
(59rb) [Whether higher angels can reveal future contingents to lower 
angels].
27. Utrum aliqua creatura possit certifi care de futuro contingenti (59va) 
[Whether a creature can be made certain concerning a future contin-
gent].
28. Utrum certitudo revelationis de futuris contingentibus stet cum contin-
gentia eorum (60ra) [Whether the certainty of  the revelation of  future 
contingents is consistent with their contingency].
29. Utrum omnes formae argumentorum quae solent fi eri in ista materia 
possint solvi (60rb) incomplete [Whether every form of  argument which is 
usually made concerning these matters, i.e., the issue of  future contingents, 
can be solved].
Old Evidence for the Authenticity and the Classifi cation of  the Work
What reasons do we have to think that these are properly quodlibetal 
disputations? In his initial analysis of  the manuscript, Etzkorn points 
out that the length and structure of  the questions support this classifi ca-
tion.49 In my examination of  the text I have found nothing to contradict 
Etzkorn’s characterization or judgment on this matter.
Etzkorn offered both internal and external evidence that this quodli-
bet belongs to Walter Chatton. His external evidence is as good as we 
might hope for. First, there is a marginal attribution to Chaton, in the 
same hand as the scribe of  the main text. Second, Adam Wodeham 
cites Chatton by name and then transcribes very closely a portion of  
the text contained in question 16. Moreover, the internal evidence that 
49 Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” p. 325.
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can be adduced from philosophical content is compelling. Etzkorn notes 
that the author of  this quodlibet attacks prominent Ockhamist theses, 
for example “about quantity not being distinct from quality, about 
circumstances being the partial object of  moral acts, about the use of  
reduplicative terms in explaining the trinity, etc.”50
A closer examination of  content of  the text continues to bear this 
out. To the above evidence we can also add the following incidents 
of  corroboration: (1) in question 16, the author inveighs against the 
Ockhamist view that only an interior act of  bad will is properly called 
sin, arguing instead that while the interior act is immediately sinful, the 
consequent exterior act is also properly called sinful as well; (2) in ques-
tion 5, the author rebuts the Ockhamist view that there are two souls in 
man, one sensitive, one rational; (3) in question 24 the author supports 
the species in medio, a favorite Chattonian theme, and again criticizes 
both the Ockhamist rejection of  the species in medio and Ockham’s own 
account of  action at a distance; (4) stylistic considerations are broadly 
consistent with the attribution to Chatton.
The fi nal piece of  internal evidence for attribution to Chatton is 
extremely strong. This concerns Chatton’s anti-razor, which Etzkorn 
dubbed the propositio Chattonis, and which I discussed above under the 
name “the Chatton Principle.” Question 23 contains an extended 
defense of  the Chatton Principle, and Etzkorn believed that this was 
the most “telling evidence” for Chatton’s authorship, so important a 
role does this principle play in Chatton’s argument in his Reportatio and 
Lectura for the need to posit res respectivae.51
New Evidence for Authenticity and Dating
Unfortunately, to determine the date of  this work we cannot simply 
argue that the Quodlibet must correspond with a quodlibet Chatton deter-
mined during his regency (which began in 1329), on the ground that 
all and only regent masters determined quodlibeta and recorded these 
determinationes; we now believe that by the fourteenth century, formed 
bachelors sometimes did this as well.52 Fortunately, however, we can fi x 
the date using more texts from Adam Wodeham, specifi cally books III 
and IV of  his Oxford commentary on the Sentences. Therein Wodeham 
50 Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” p. 325.
51 Etzkorn, “The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15.805,” pp. 325–6.
52 Although this is controversial; see the discussion about dating Holcot’s Quodlibeta, 
below.
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not only confi rms that Chatton determined questions during the time 
of  his regency,53 just as we would expect, but he also gives us a glimpse 
into the content of  this determinatio, allowing us clearly to show that the 
text identifi ed by Etzkorn in Paris 15805 is in fact Walter Chatton’s 
magisterial Oxford determinatio.
In book III, d. 14, q. 11, Wodeham takes issue with Chatton’s indivisi-
bilism as expressed in a determinatio, in particular with the opinion “that 
the continuum is not composed from divisible [but rather indivisible] 
parts.”54 This opinion occurred, Wodeham tells us, in a question attack-
ing Ockham on the issue of  quantity.55 Although none of  the question 
titles in Chatton’s Quodlibet mentions the continuum directly, indivisibles 
are mentioned in the text of  question 22, which question deals with the 
issue of  quantity, taking Ockham as the principal opponent. Moreover, 
Chatton apparently responded to Wodeham’s arguments in III.14.11, 
coming back with arguments that Wodeham felt bound to respond to 
again in book IV, q. 5, of  his Oxford commentary, mentioning that 
Chatton’s determinatio occurred during the time of  his regency.56 Specifi -
cally, Wodeham says this:
You should note what [Chatton] himself  posited afterwards, in the period 
of  his magistracy, in a determinatio (which determinatio I myself  heard—and 
he said these same things previously as well, when he read the Sentences). 
We have from him that one indivisible is naturally able to be together in 
the same place as another indivisible, for otherwise, according to him, it 
would not be possible to save condensation and rarefaction . . .57
53 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 70, n. 112.
54 Wodeham, Lectura Oxoniensis III, d. 14, q. 11 (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, lat. 
915, f. 193va), from the transcription in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 72, n. 127. “Chat-
ton in quadam determinatione Oxon. quod continuum non componitur ex partibus 
divisibilibus . . . audivi postquam illam materiam Londoniae pertractavi.”
55 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 72.
56 Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot, 
eds. P.A. Streveler and K.H. Tachau, with H.G. Gelber and W.J. Courtenay (Toronto 
1995), p. 24, n. 63. Hereafter the introduction to this critical edition will be cited 
thus: Tachau, Seeing the Future. See also Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 73, but only in 
conjunction with the note immediately succeeding this one.
57 Wodeham, Lectura Oxoniensis IV, q. 5, a. 2 (Paris, Mazarine 915, f. 216ra, ll. 39–45). 
The text is slightly corrupt. Here is an exact transcription, which I have emended in 
obvious ways for my translation: “Nota quod ipse post, tempore magisterii sui posuit 
in determinatione et quam et ego ipse tunc et sicut priora alias audivi dum legit sen-
tentias ab eo indivisibile naturaliter esse compossibile alteri indivisibili secundum situm 
quia aliter secundum eum non posset salvari condensatio et rarefi catio . . .” Note that 
Courtenay transcribes this same text as “Nota quod ipse post tempus magisterii . . .” The 
difference in the underlined phrase would importantly change the meaning to say that 
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Indeed, in question 22 of  the Chattonian text in Paris 15805, we fi nd 
Chatton making this very claim in the context of  an exchange with an 
Ockhamist interlocutor, very possibly Wodeham himself:
We should say that this proposition is not true for really existing things 
without such an accident [i.e., a quantity]: ‘This substance is naturally 
unable to exist at the same time in the same place with a second sub-
stance’.
But it could be argued [against me] as follows: “The parts of  quantity 
can exist naturally [in the same place] at the same time, because [accord-
ing to you, Chatton], indivisibles compose the parts of  substance, and 
indivisibles can exist naturally [in the same place] at the same time through 
natural causes. Otherwise, according to you something that is dispersed 
could not be condensed.”
It should be said in response: it is true that the [indivisible] parts of  
quantity can be [in the same place] at the same time. Nevertheless the 
extended parts of  quantity cannot . . .
I say that while one part of  a quantum [which is composed of  indi-
visibles] remains extended, it cannot naturally be [in the same place] at 
the same time with another part of  that substance, while that other part 
also remains extended. Nevertheless, the indivisible, condensable parts 
themselves can be in the same place [at the same time].58
So the text in Paris 15805 has Chatton arguing that indivisibles can be 
in the same place at the same time, precisely to save the phenomenon of  
condensation and rarefaction, just as Wodeham reports events occurred 
in Chatton’s magisterial determinatio. This, together with Etzkorn’s ear-
lier arguments, settles the issue of  the authorship of  these questions 
in Paris 15805 beyond doubt, and it also helps us fi x their date quite 
fi rmly. The text must date to either 1329–30, since this is known to 
be the fi rst year of  his regency, or possibly to the year after, 1330–31, 
since he would likely have also been master, although non regens, for a 
second consecutive year.
Chatton’s determination came after the period of  his regency, not during it. Neverthe-
less, Tachau reads the text as I do, with post as an adverb, not a preposition, and with 
tempore instead of  tempus, thereby agreeing with me that the determination was during 
his regency. Careful examination of  Mazarine 915, f. 216ra, l. 42, reveals the crucial 
abbreviation is te = tempore; so Tachau and I are correct. It should be noted that the 
raised “e” of  the abbreviation here is of  such a form that it could easily be mistaken 
for t9 = tempus. This typographical fact, and the relative infrequency of  “post” as an 
adverb, are the likely sources of  Courtenay’s misreading.
58 Chatton, Quodlibet, q. 22, nn. 46–9, from the transcription by Etzkorn.
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Unfortunately, this new evidence for attribution raises some ques-
tion about whether the Chattonian determinatio in Paris 15805 is in fact 
a quodlibet, as Etzkorn had argued, since a determinatio could be given 
by a master to a question that was not asked as part of  a quodlibetal 
exercise. Wodeham’s use of  the term determinatio, when he might have 
used the more precise quodlibet (and actually does in other cases) leaves 
us some doubt about whether this text belongs in the genre at all. Up 
to this point we have had only Wodeham’s use of  the ambiguous term 
determinatio, and his non-use of  quodlibet, on the one side of  the issue, 
and Etzkorn’s observations of  form and length on the other. However, 
some new evidence can add a little weight to the case for this text being 
a quodlibet. Etzkorn originally found a title for these questions, partly 
obscured by the gutter margin, the visible letters of  which were “-libet.” 
Recent re-examination of  the manuscript shows that this title does 
indeed say “Quodlibet,” and confi rms Etzkorn’s judgment that the label 
is in the same hand as the main text and the bulk of  the organizational 
marginalia.59 This evidence is certainly not decisive, but it increases the 
reasonableness of  our presumption that Chatton’s magisterial determinatio 
cited by Wodeham is correctly called his Quodlibet.
Content
Although one can obtain some sense of  the content of  Chatton’s 
Quodlibet through the question list and the discussion above, some more 
comprehensive information about the opponents, issues, and doctrines 
in the text will serve to round out and complete the picture.
The twenty-nine questions of  the Quodlibet can be usefully divided 
into six subject categories. The chart below shows which questions 
address these topics:
59 The marginalia for these folia in Paris 15805 are in two distinct hands. Nearly all 
are in the same hand as the main scribe, and consist primarily of  such organizational 
labels as “contra,” “prima ratio,” “secundum dubium,” and the like. In addition, all 
29 questions, save only two, have a brief  (usually one- or two-word) description of  the 
question’s subject matter. These latter remarks occur in a different hand, and would 
seem to be later additions.
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Categories Questions Opponents, if  known




9 a. 2—the causes of  
contingency




29—solving puzzles on 
future contingents
All articles in 9 seem 
directed against Aquinas 
or a follower; Scotus and 




ditions for the will to sin
Possibly Aquinas.
(1c) Contingency of  
creation
9 a. 3—necessity of  a 
consequentia about God’s 
actions
Aquinas or a follower.
(2) Res respectivae and 
other accidental beings
1—causality of  fi nal 
causes




All are against Ockham.
(3) Damnation, Biblical 
law, cannon law, and 
sin
2—sin and aggravating 
circumstances
4—ignorance as an 
excuse for sin






15—mortal vs. venial sin
20—ordering a clerk to 
be beaten
By and large the 
opponents here are 
unknown or else there 
is no real opponent. 
Authorities include 
Augustine, Anselm, and 
canon law.
(4) Moral science, right 
reason and sin
5—political strength as 
a virtue
12—ends as objects of  
moral acts
13—prudence and the 
will
14—fault and human 
conscience
16—sin as an interior 
act only
17—merit of  loving 
enemies vs. friends
19—Abraham and Isaac
5, 12, 16 are aimed 
against Ockham; 14 
against Alexander 
of  Hales; 19 against 
Aquinas, Bonaventure, 
et al.
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Table (cont.)
Categories Questions Opponents, if  known
(5) Christology and the 
Trinity
8, 9 a. 4—grace in 
Christ’s soul




21—the Trinity and 
reduplicative terms
21 is Ockham. 
(6) Miscellany 3—the immaculate 
conception
9 a. 1—creatures being 
present to eternity
24—the species in medio
3 surveys an enormous 
number of  opinions: 
Lombard, Augustine, 
Anselm, Richard of  St 
Victor, Grosseteste, etc.; 
24 is against Ockham, 
and possibly Auriol.
The distinction between categories (3) and (4) may seem a little artifi cial, 
but the basic idea is that controversies raised in questions of  type (3) 
are treated by Chatton as matters to be settled by canon law or biblical 
interpretation (he frequently cites the Bible and the Decretales Gregorii IX 
in these questions), while issues of  type (4) are treated as philosophical 
topics, with Ockham as the most common opponent. If  we consider 
the number of  questions under headings (3) and (4), as well as the drift 
of  most of  the topics in (1), we can easily convince ourselves that the 
bulk of  Chatton’s Quodlibet, both theologically and philosophically, is 
focused on issues of  moral responsibility, sin, and merit.
What explains this focus? There may not be much to explain here, 
since Chatton had always discussed moral questions in his philosophy 
and theology. Many old, favorite Chattonian themes do at least make an 
appearance in this work dominated by moral issues: we see the debate 
over res respectivae (qq. 1, 23), res in other accidental categories besides 
quantity (q. 22), and future contingents (qq. 9, a. 2, and 26–29). And 
yet there really does seem to be a pattern here, which refl ects something 
about either Chatton or the climate at Oxford or perhaps both. Two 
explanations suggest themselves.
It might be that this work simply refl ects a natural shift in interests for 
Chatton, or more generally for theologians at Oxford. This shift may 
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have been positive (increased interest in ethics),60 or negative (decreased 
interest in epistemology). Or, it is possible that Ockham’s departure for 
Avignon, and his radical shift toward political theory after 1324, had 
left Chatton without his worthy opponent as a target.
I favor a combination of  these explanations. Ockham was Chatton’s 
strongest center of  gravity, and by the earliest possible date for the 
Quodlibet Ockham had completely ceased to involve himself  in sub-
jects at the heart of  all their old disputes. It then seems reasonable to 
conclude that Chatton was thereafter inclined to shift toward a dif-
ferent pole of  his thought, always present but previously overawed by 
considerations of  epistemology and metaphysics, which was now able 
to shine forth as the well of  his previous critical philosophy ran dry. 
To state the matter most succinctly, it seems that Ockham’s Quodlibeta 
strongly refl ect Chatton’s presence, while Chatton’s Quodlibet strongly 
refl ects Ockham’s absence.
Robert Holcot
The Oxford-trained Dominican Robert Holcot was born around 1300 
near Northampton, read the Sentences at Oxford in the opening years 
of  the 1330s, was regent in the middle 1330s, and rose to some promi-
nence in ecclesiastical and literary affairs before his death in 1349. The 
customary sketch of  his intellectual life associates his philosophy both 
with Ockhamism and Thomism. Recent research allows us to fl esh out 
the picture of  his life and character beyond these few basic facts, and 
to consider possible dates for his Sentences commentary, which in turn 
yield possible dates for his Quodlibeta.
In one aspect, his intellectual personality is quite similar to Chatton’s 
and Ockham’s: as we would expect, we see great reliance on the tools 
of  the new English theology, such as logic and conceptual analysis 
stemming from supposition theory, or the theory of  exponables.61 Thus, 
in one way Holcot is quite representative of  the tradition thriving at 
Oxford during this period.
60 A point often made in H.G. Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and 
Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden-Boston 2004), passim.
61 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 269.
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A somewhat unusual feature of  Holcot’s biography is his connection 
with the London court of  Richard de Bury, bishop of  Durham. While 
there is nothing unexpected about a mendicant theologian having a 
patron of  this sort, Bury’s court itself  was unusually receptive to and 
productive of  literature that showed an awareness of  the classical tra-
dition. Holcot fl ourished in this environment, fi lled with people whom 
Tachau refers to as “ ‘proto’-humanist literati.”62 From this support, 
with the aid of  his logically rigorous Oxford training, Holcot crafted 
several extremely well-loved texts. His popular commentaries enjoyed 
vast circulation in the fourteenth and fi fteenth centuries; indeed, it is 
plausible to suggest that Holcot had a wider intellectual infl uence in 
the century after his death than even Ockham.63 In particular, it is for 
his biblical commentaries, composed after 1334, that he was most well 
known; his commentary on the Book of  Wisdom survives in at least 175 
fourteenth- and fi fteenth-century manuscript copies, and was cited into 
the beginning of  the seventeenth century.64 This text seems to have been 
one of  Chaucer’s sources for the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.65 Moreover, this 
fame seems to have attached to his more academic writing as well; his 
Sentences commentary, surviving in whole or part in forty-eight known 
witnesses, was among the most notable of  the later Middle Ages. Also 
popular were his Sex articuli and Quodlibeta, composed not long after his 
Sentences commentary.
But when was his Sentences commentary written? Here we fi nd some 
disagreement and some new evidence to consider. Since the relative 
dating of  his Quodlibeta to his Sentences commentary brings up larger 
issues about who could determine quodlibeta in this period, and since 
a brief  discussion of  the absolute dating of  his Sentences commentary 
will help us fi x his Quodlibeta, it is a highly relevant place to begin the 
discussion.
62 Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 2.
63 An enormous bibliography for Holcot can be found in Gelber, It Could Have Been 
Otherwise, p. 92, n. 105. For a list of  studies on Holcot before 1970, see p. 480, n. 1, of  
R.E. Gillespie, “Robert Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” Traditio 27 (1971), pp. 480–90. For studies 
up until 1983, see the footnotes of  H.G. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason: Three 
Questions on the Nature of  God, by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto 1983), passim.
64 Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 2–3.
65 Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 2.
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 Holcot’s Quodlibeta
Dating, Manuscript Tradition, Attribution, and Arrangement of  Questions
There seem to be two views on when Holcot lectured on the Sentences: 
either in the biennium 1330–32, a view favored by Schepers and 
Courtenay,66 or else in 1331–33, a view favored by Tachau.67 Both 
Courtenay and Tachau seem to agree that, at any rate, his Quodlibeta 
must have come after this period, likely in 1333–34. Moreover, both 
Tachau and Courtenay rely on certain remarks by Holcot in his Sex 
articuli to a William Crathorn in order to establish their chronologies; 
the difference comes from the fact that that Courtenay also accepts, 
while Tachau rejects, an additional (apparent) assertion by Holcot that 
Crathorn lectured on the Sentences for only one year. Since Crathorn’s 
Sentences commentary was clearly delivered in 1330, Courtenay must 
hold that Holcot too began his lectures in 1330, while Tachau, who 
thinks that Holcot refers in this crucial text to a Crafton/Grafton rather 
than Crathorn, is free to adopt the other view, which better fi ts some 
other pieces of  evidence.
The consequences of  this disagreement for Holcot’s Quodlibeta are as 
follows. While on either chronology the disputations were likely held 
around 1333–34, on Tachau’s view Holcot would still be giving Bible 
lectures at that same time (or would just have fi nished doing so), cer-
tainly not yet having attained the regency, and so we would not only 
have to accept the idea of  a bachelor determining quodlibeta, we would 
also have to face an extremely compressed view of  Holcot’s overall 
career trajectory, with a tremendous bottleneck occurring in 1333–34. 
Courtenay’s view avoids this bottleneck. To complicate matters, Gelber 
has recently come out in favor of  Tachau’s crucial assertion that Holcot 
refers to Crafton/Grafton rather than Crathorn, while at the same time 
disagreeing with her conclusions about the date of  the Quodlibeta, and 
in particular with the compression implied by Tachau’s view, as well as 
the pre-magisterial timing it assumes.68 On Gelber’s latest view, these 
Quodlibeta should be dated to the time of  his regency, perhaps even 
exclusively, an event which she places in 1336–37.
66 Although Courtenay entertains hypotheses of  even earlier readings, and of  his 
reading for a single year only, this is the view he explicitly endorses, following Schepers. 
See Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 96–100, especially p. 97.
67 A table on Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 27 nicely summarizes her views.
68 Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, pp. 90–1 and 94–5.
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Since it is diffi cult at this stage to see who has the better total case, 
the prudent conclusion is perhaps that Holcot’s Quodlibeta can be safely 
dated to around 1333–37, although the question of  precisely where 
the work fi ts in his overall career path is not simple and remains hotly 
contested in the details.
Whenever it may have been compiled, Holcot’s quodlibetal collection, 
containing roughly one hundred questions overall, is far closer in size 
to Ockham’s than to Chatton’s collection. The questions are divided 
into three Quodlibeta, two of  roughly equal size, the other about twice as 
large. Unfortunately, the manuscript tradition for Holcot’s Quodlibeta is 
quite diffi cult.69 This is not to say that there are no reasonable editions 
of  individual questions, but rather that the amount of  confusion and 
confl icting evidence facing an editor of  Holcot’s Quodlibeta is suffi cient 
to block many conclusions that we would hope to draw fi rmly about 
the ordering, relative dating, and hence preferred readings of  Holcot’s 
intended text. Nevertheless, some scholars70 have made heroic efforts at 
managing the many detailed diffi culties. I will not attempt to recount 
here all the details of  these labors, but will instead acquaint the reader 
with what seems uncontroversial, with one or two fundamental points 
of  diffi culty, and with the status of  current research.
Editors of  his Quodlibet rely on three manuscripts:71
(R) Royal = London, British Library, Royal 10.C.vi
(P) Pembroke = Cambridge, Pembroke College 236
(B) Balliol = Oxford, Balliol College Library 246
In addition there is some related disputational material in a 1497 Lyons 
edition, which Gelber calls the Determinationes, as well as a fourth manu-
script, Düsseldorf, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, F.5, which has 
not been used thus far and which apparently includes Determinationes 
on ff. 239v–325r.72
69 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, p. 3.
70 Notably Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, pp. 1–28, and Tachau, Seeing 
the Future, pp. 1–56. See also the less extensive but foundational work in Gillespie, 
“Holcot’s Quodlibeta.”
71 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, p. 3; Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 28. For a 
summary of  the main physical characteristics of  the manuscripts, and also references 
to longer detailed descriptions, see Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 28–9.
72 See Sharpe, Handlist, p. 557 (revised 2001 edition) and the on-line catalogue of  
the Düsseldorf, Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek. Manuscript F 5 is paper, 330 + i 
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The three manuscripts that editors have employed differ enormously 
in the questions that they contain and in the order, arrangement, and 
hence implied interrelation of  those questions; clearly they represent 
three distinct lines of  transmission.73 P contains some ninety-nine ques-
tions, B has ninety-one, while R contains only thirty-eight. (Despite 
appearances, the total number of  questions exceeds 100, since B and 
R contain some questions not in P.) On the basis of  this disparity, one 
early scholarly examination74 ascribes Holcot’s personal touch to Royal. 
The view is that, compared to P and B, the more logical arrangement 
of  R, together with its shorter length, is evidence of  authorial pruning, 
and hence an indication that R’s readings ought to be preferred.75 Gil-
lespie, and to a much greater degree Gelber, dispute the orderliness of  
R, and hence reject this reading of  R’s importance, emphasizing that 
consideration of  Holcot’s quodlibetal collection must be based more 
on the other two witnesses, and must not rely on this assumed status of  
R.76 A second tradition, developed by Shepers,77 instead elevates P on 
the ground that it represents a later stage of  treatment of  the disputed 
questions and so has preference over B. On this view, R represents, not 
an authorial redaction, but a mutilated version of  even later develop-
ments made previously in P. As the sole non-mutilated (i.e., relatively 
complete) early version of  a relatively late stage (and so authoritative) 
redaction, P deserves more attention than R and B.78 Gelber tends to 
discount this view also, and adduces other reasons (in terms of  the 
details of  the pecia system) to explain the variations existing among the 
manuscripts; it is due to the piecemeal availability of  portions of  long 
texts that we see disorder and incompleteness in, for example, the Royal 
folios, and contains Holcot’s complete Sentences commentary (ff. 4r–194v) as well. Gel-
ber and Tachau completed their work earlier and thus were not able to examine this 
witness, although Tachau lists it for the Sentences commentary (Seeing the Future, p. 36). 
Nevertheless, Gelber and Tachau remain the most recent in-depth studies.
73 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, p. 3; Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 28. For 
a table comparing the three manuscripts, question-title for question-title, see Gelber, 
Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, pp. 113–17.
74 K. Michalski, “La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au 
XIVe siècle,” Bulletin international de l’Académie Polonaise de Sciences et Des Lettres (Krakow 
1928), pp. 125–33.
75 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, p. 4.
76 Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 485–6; Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  
Reason, pp. 3–8.
77 H. Schepers, “Holcot contra dicta Crathorn,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 77 (1970), 
pp. 320–54, and 79 (1972), pp. 106–36.
78 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, p. 8.
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manuscript.79 Rather than arguing for any one of  these manuscripts 
being authoritative, Gelber ends up using external and internal evi-
dence to argue through question by question, constructing a plausible 
partial arrangement for the questions in the three quodlibeta.80 Tachau 
proceeds in largely the same fashion, taking Gelber’s discussion as her 
starting point.81
While all these authors make reasonable points and adduce plau-
sible and relevant evidence for their views, it is clear that in the end 
each one approaches the text in part by feel, taking readings and 
manuscript relations on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, it is clear that 
this less grand approach is the right one, given the situation. The level 
of  detail, the dependencies and many assumptions involved in their 
competing appraisals and explanations at the larger level eventually 
become so ponderous that it is diffi cult to see who has more traction 
in the debate. If  we add to this that some of  Holcot’s questions might 
not have been originally part of  any public determinatio, and hence not 
even quodlibetal, since Holcot seems to have composed some of  them 
for inclusion in his Sentences commentary, we are faced with a bleak 
outlook indeed.82 From these very skilled editors we have received as 
good a version of  Holcot’s text as we are likely to get in each case, 
but very little weight can be rationally given to any general arguments 
about the development of  Holcot’s thought or career if  they rely solely 
on the overarching theories of  manuscript relations discussed in the 
sources noted above.
The attribution of  these one hundred or so quodlibetal questions to 
Robert Holcot is not seriously disputed. The tradition of  attribution 
is quite old; a handful of  questions in the 1497 Lyons Determinationes 
attributed (mostly correctly) to Holcot is taken in part from a manu-
script version of  these very questions.83 I shall not take up space listing 
the question titles; for details the reader can consult Gillespie’s helpful 
enumeration of  all the question titles for this material,84 and Gelber’s 
79 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, pp. 9–11.
80 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, pp. 11–23. Tables 2 and 3 on pp. 116–17 
collect these results for Quodlibeta I and III.
81 Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 31–5.
82 Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 21.
83 Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” p. 482.
84 Gillespie, “Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 487–90.
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tables comparing question titles across manuscripts and offering partial 
reconstructions of  Quodlibeta I and III.85
Content
The one hundred or so questions Holcot determines refl ect much the 
same proportion of  topics as Chatton’s Quodlibet. Most questions involve 
moral issues that were important at the time: sin, merit, grace, etc., for 
example: “Whether Socrates should sin mortally if  eternal life were to 
follow from that sin,” “Whether souls leaving purgatory are grateful 
for the penalty they paid there,” “Whether any venial sin diminishes 
the habit of  charity,” and “Whether the law of  uncreated wisdom 
obliges the wayfarer to impossibilities.”86 There are also the questions 
on future contingents, one of  which I discuss in detail below. Of  course, 
Holcot discussed other paradoxes of  God’s knowledge that are linked 
to the problem of  foreknowledge and future contingents, for example 
“Whether God can know more than he knows.”87
We also see in these question titles Holcot’s greater interest in bibli-
cal exegesis compared to either Ockham or Chatton. For example, he 
asks “Whether the blessed Matthew correctly narrated the genealogy 
of  Christ” and “Whether the history of  the conception of  Christ is in 
all respects true.”88 Similarly, the number of  questions in one way or 
another concerning the beatifi c vision refl ects an increased interest in 
that topic compared to when Chatton and Ockham were at Oxford. 
Questions on Christology and the Trinity are absolutely more numer-
ous than, but in proportion with, those in Chatton.
Not enough of  Holcot’s Quodlibeta are edited for them to be useful 
in pinning down his thought in any comprehensive way. However, an 
interesting set of  questions concerning future contingents has been 
published, and I will discuss one or two issues in connection with those 
questions, to highlight certain features of  his treatment and to give a 
glimpse of  some of  the philosophical substance therein.
Holcot’s treatment of  future contingents shows close kinship with 
that of  FitzRalph, for example, in arguing that the contingent future 
85 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of  Reason, pp. 113–17.
86 These are questions 32, 45, 66, and 75, respectively, from Gillespie’s enumeration, 
“Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” pp. 487–90.
87 This is question 96 in Gillespie.
88 These are questions 3 and 4, respectively, in Gillespie.
SCHABEL_F16_650-692.indd   684 7/19/2007   8:51:21 PM
 oxford QUODLIBETA from ockham to holcot 685
remains contingent even after revelation.89 In general, Holcot tries to 
solve the dilemmas of  future contingents by working the contingency 
side of  the equation; he is not, in general terms, a compatibilist, and 
rather seems to accept that claims of  necessity for revealed truths 
would in fact destroy freedom, human or divine. His approach to these 
questions exhibits the logical and semantic devices of  the new English 
theology, which was in full bloom during his time at Oxford.90
An example of  this application comes in Quodlibet III, q. 3, which 
asks “Whether this consequence is necessary: ‘God knows that a will 
be, therefore a will be,’ where ‘a’ signifi es a future contingent.”91 Hol-
cot thinks that the consequence is indeed necessary, but he attempts 
to forestall the argument that might follow from it as a premise: for, 
letting a stand for a future contingent, it seems that: 
(i) if  ‘God knows that a will be, therefore a will be’, is in fact neces-
sary, then
(ii) since the antecedent, ‘God knows that a will be’, is also necessary, 
it follows that
(iii) the consequent, ‘a will be’, must be necessary as well.
But if  every statement of  the form ‘a will be’ is necessary, then the 
contingency of  the future seems lost.92
Wisely, Holcot does not dispute the fi rst premise. Rather, he focuses 
his attention on (ii). The trick is to do this in way that does not com-
promise divine knowledge, for example, by making it look as though 
God is somehow hazy about the future. Holcot’s overall strategy is 
common; he tries to say that although God himself  is necessary, He 
knows a in a contingent way: “We should say that this is contingent: 
‘God knows that a will be’, because He knows that a will be in such 
a way that He might never have known that a will be.”93 Nevertheless 
89 A weaker position than, for example, Bradwardine. Tachau, Seeing the Future, 
p. 49.
90 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 269.
91 Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 73.
92 In terms of  modern modal logic, this is simply an application of  the K axiom and 
modus ponens, i.e., by the K axiom we can go from the necessity of  the consequence, 
 (p → q), to the necessity of  both parts, (  p →  q). If  the antecedent is also neces-
sary,  p, we immediately have  q. All normal modal logics, and hence most plausible 
accounts of  alethic modality, include the K axiom.
93 “Dicendum quod haec est contingens: ‘Deus scit a fore,’ quia sic scit a fore quod 
potuit numquam scivisse a fore,” Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 73.
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the execution of  this common strategy is interesting: essentially, he 
argues that the antecedent, ‘God knows that a will be’, when prop-
erly exposited, is seen to have two exponents: one necessary and one 
contingent. This contingency, which is built-in to the antecedent, but 
hidden within it, corrupts its overall necessity, and the argument above 
is blocked at step (ii).
Does this gambit work? Holcot asserts that the proper exposition of  
‘God knows that a will be’ is:
(a) God assents to this proposition: ‘a will be’, and
(b) it will turn out that a will be.94
Clearly (b), considered by itself, is contingent. This strategy appears 
to work because it splits the necessity and the contingency that seem 
bundled together in the claim that God knows (necessarily) what will (con-
tingently) happen, since, the division having been made, we see that the 
contingency of  the one pole spoils the apparent necessity of  the entire 
bundle.95
But it seems to me that we can easily raise the problem of  future 
contingents all over again using (a) and (b). Precisely what we need to 
explain now, given (a) and (b) as an exposition of  ‘God knows that a 
will be’, is how it could be that God would assent to a proposition and 
yet it would only be contingent that what that proposition says will 
come true. If  God assents to a, then, since He cannot be mistaken, it 
seems a must be true. The problem is that God’s assent, on whatever 
ground it is given, once given makes a’s falsehood entail a contradiction 
(‘God is mistaken’ is a contradiction); which means that a cannot be 
false without contradiction; which means a’s falsehood is impossible; 
which means a is necessary.
The original strategy is somewhat more successful if  we consider 
instead the general modal claim he makes, viz., that when a proposi-
tion has multiple exponents, if  one of  them is contingent the original 
proposition is as well. With certain important qualifi cations this claim 
seems correct, and can be defended. Suppose that Holcot is saying:
94 “‘Deus scit a fore’ aequivalet isti copulative: ‘Deus assentit huic complexo: “a erit,” 
et ita erit quod a erit . . .” Tachau, Seeing the Future, p. 74.
95 This approach may have been pioneered by Chatton. See C. Schabel, Theology at 
Paris, 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of  Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents 
(Aldershot 2000), pp. 231–40, and 249.
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(i) p ↔ (q ∧ r)
(ii) ~  q  ∨ ~  r
(iii) therefore, ~  p
Here p stands for the proposition to be exposited, and q and r for two 
exponents. Then, the argument is that if  q and r together form the 
exposition of  p, and if  either q or r is non-necessary, then p is non-neces-
sary as well. The argument will be valid, but only provided that premise 
(i), the exposition, is itself  necessary, i.e., provided we replace (i) with 
the stronger claim  [ p ↔ (q ∧ r)]. To see this, let us take it that one of  
the exponents, say q, is non-necessary. So we have that ~  q. But this 
means that there is a possible world in which q is false. Call this world 
α. Now, since q is false in α, we could reason by virtue of  (i), p ↔ (q ∧ r), 
that p is false in α as well, in which case we would have the desired 
conclusion, ~  p. But this will only work if p ↔ (q ∧ r) is also true in 
α. But since α is otherwise arbitrary, the truth of  p ↔ (q ∧ r) cannot be 
established in α except generally, and not generally unless p ↔ (q ∧ r) 
is true in every possible world and so is necessary; i.e., ~  p cannot 
be established unless we have that  [ p ↔ (q ∧ r)]. Similar reasoning 
will work if  we take the other alternative in (ii), ~  r.96 Thus Holcot’s 
strategy is committed to the view that expositions hold necessarily, or 
at least that this exposition holds necessarily. This might be plausible, 
given certain views of  language and truth. But notice that the specifi c 
claim he needs here is very strong; it must be true not only that he 
has given a plausible or proper exposition of  ‘God knows that a will 
be’, rather, it must also be true that this particular exposition necessarily 
exposits ‘God knows that a will be’. For so strong a claim as this we 
get no evidence from Holcot.
John of  Rodington
Who else determined quodlibeta around this period? What we know of  
fourteenth-century English theology suggests that every Oxford master 
96 This argument for the invalidity of  Holcot’s original argument is very informal, and 
is so expressed for ease of  reading; however, a formal counter-model can easily be given 
to show the argument as written is invalid. Similarly, the formal validity of  my amended 
argument is easily shown in any normal modal logic, and indeed for some weaker modal 
logics as well, so long as they contain the schema  [(A ∧ B) → (  A ∧  B)].
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would have determined some quodlibetal questions, but the survival of  
written Oxford quodlibeta from 1322–34 is less than we might expect. 
In addition to the three theologians discussed above there is only one 
other major fi gure who requires some discussion, John of  Rodington. 
However, for the sake of  completeness, before discussing Rodington, a 
few fi gures whose quodlibeta came a little before Ockham deserve brief  
mention. Only two very small quodlibetal collections are currently 
known for John of  Reading OFM (master in 1320, died after 1323 
in Avignon); Quodlibet I, q. 4, has been edited.97 William of  Alnwick 
OFM (d. 1333) has an edited Quodlibet, probably delivered at Oxford in 
1315–16.98 In roughly this same period, the Augustinian friar Richard 
Wetwang gave a quodlibet that was recorded but does not now survive, 
although it is not certain this was delivered at Oxford.99 Moreover, 
Carmelite Godfrey of  Cornwall (died after 1347) had a quodlibet of  
unknown date, which we no longer possess, but which was cited by 
fellow Carmelite John Baconthorpe.100
One fi nal, diffi cult case should be noted. Adam Wodeham refers to 
a Grafton, who was once thought to be Edmund Grafton OFM (died 
after 1336).101 But Wodeham’s reference is possibly rather to a John 
Grafton (or Crafton) OP. John Grafton/Crafton is known only for his 
currently unedited Quodlibet in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbiblio-
thek, lat. 5460, ff. 32rff. Two clear attributions testify that the question 
“Utrum ex puris naturalibus homo possit habere certam cognitionem 
de aliqua veritate” (f. 32ra) is quodlibetal and authored by “Iohannis 
Crafton.” There follows another question, “Utrum Deus cognoscat 
distincte omnia quae potest producere” (f. 32vb), which makes a refer-
ence back to the fi rst. Hence these two quodlibetal questions at least 
 97 Sharpe, Handlist, p. 300; Glorieux II, p. 184; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 
1554; E. Longpré, “Jean de Reading et le B. Jean Duns Scot,” La France Franciscaine 7 
(1924), pp. 99–109. Quodlibet I, q. 4, is edited in M. Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatorius 
des Thomas Anglicus II (Münster 1930), pp. 286*–307*. C. Balic has a transcription of  
a passage from Quodlibet I, q. 3, in Ratio criticae editionis operum omnium I.D. Scoti (Rome 
1941), pp. 106–8. For some biography see especially Longpré, “Jean de Reading,” 
pp. 101–4.
 98 Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 745–7; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 27. Alnwick’s Quod-
libet is in Quaestiones disputatae De esse intelligibili et De quodlibet, ed. A. Ledoux (Bibliotheca 
Franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 10) (Quaracchi 1937), pp. 179–605. See also W.O. 
Duba’s chapter in this volume.
 99 Sharpe, Handlist, p. 519; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 2027.
100 Sharpe, Handlist, p. 150; Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 489.
101 Sharpe, Handlist, p. 107.
SCHABEL_F16_650-692.indd   688 7/19/2007   8:51:22 PM
 oxford QUODLIBETA from ockham to holcot 689
are plausibly attributable to Grafton/Crafton. But following these 
two questions are eight more, before the text switches to a Sentences 
commentary by William Crathorn.102 The authorship of  these eight 
is still in doubt, and at least one of  them might belong to Crathorn 
himself; indeed, it seems possible that all ten of  these questions really 
just belong to Crathorn, i.e., it may be that Crafton = Crathorn, and 
there is no John Grafton/Crafton at all.103 The problems here bear an 
obvious connection to those surrounding the dates for Holcot’s Sentences 
commentary, as discussed above, and are yet to be fully solved. The 
diffi culties of  this case are further compounded by the fact that John 
Grafton does not seem to have an independent biography; he does not 
even appear in Emden.
It is important and remarkable to note that there really are no surviv-
ing fourteenth-century Oxford quodlibeta after those of  Holcot.104
The textual situation for the Quodlibet of  John of  Rodington (or 
Rodyngton, ca. 1290–1348) is somewhat better.105 His Quodlibet is 
not extensive, nor is the modern scholarship on it; it remains mostly 
unedited, as does much of  his Sentences commentary.106 We have from 
him a few questions which circulated as the Quodlibet de conscientia, a 
work with only one partial critical edition, despite the existence of  six 
manuscript witnesses:107
102 Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 15–17.
103 Richter, who described the manuscript, seems to believe this, contra Tachau. But 
Tachau gives convincing content-based arguments against the thesis. See V. Richter, 
“Handschriftliches zu Crathorn,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 94 (1972), pp. 445–9; 
Tachau, Seeing the Future, pp. 15–17; Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 107 and 259.
104 Courtenay mentions Thomas Claxton (c. 1413) and Geoffrey Herdeby (c. 1358) 
as two later examples of  Oxford authors of  quodlibeta. But Herdeby’s Quodlibet is only 
attested, and Claxton’s collection of  seven disputed questions may or may not be 
quodlibetal. Even if  they are, their singularity underlines, rather than undermines, the 
overall point being made here. See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 45 n. 54; Sharpe, 
Handlist, pp. 125 and 650; W.J. Courtenay’s “Postscript” below.
105 Sharpe, Handlist, pp. 303–4; Emden, A Biographical Register, pp. 1583–4.
106 However, this is changing. For example, C. Schabel and R.L. Friedman, “Trini-
tarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III. Oxford 1312–1329: Walsingham, Gray-
stanes, Fitzralph, and Rodington,” CIMAGL 74 (2003) (pp. 39–88), pp. 80–8 (edition 
of  I Sent., d. 11).
107 The discussion in Glorieux II, p. 185, is brief. In this same place he mentions that, 
in addition to the Quodlibet de conscientia, the Paris manuscript follows with a list of  fi ve 
further quodlibetal questions on faith, also attributed to Rodington. But Sharpe makes 
no mention of  this; see Handlist, p. 304. A longer discussion of  the manuscripts and 
content, as well as a partial edition, is found in J. Lechner, “Johannes von Rodington 
OFM und sein Quodlibet de conscientia,” Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte; 
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(1) Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco 106 (129r–146v) 
[Lechner’s A]
(2) Brugge, Grootseminarie (Bisschoppelijke Bibliotheek) 41/133 (145r–
164r) [Lechner’s BS]
(3) Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek 503 (1r–20v) [Lechner’s BSt]
(4) München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 22023 (1r–17) [Lechner’s 
Clm]
(5) Paris, BnF lat. 15561 (230r–243r, 244v–245v) [Lechner’s P]
(6) BAV, Ottob. lat. 179 (1r–24v) [Lechner’s O]
A note following the tabula quaestionum in A (f. 146vb) relates that 
Rodington himself  organized the Quodlibet into six main questions, 
but that there were many subquestions: “Nota quod in istis 6 quaes-
tionibus principalibus de quolibet quaeruntur multae aliae quaestiones 
secundariae, quas aliqui intitulant ut principales, sed hic ponuntur ut 
magister Iohannes de Rodinghton Anglicus ordinavit. Sed non est cura, 
quia totum quod est ibi et hic et e converso. Valete.” The questions 
concern human free will, sin, grace, God’s relationship to human evil, 
predestination, reprobation, and conscience. The question titles are as 
follows:108
1. Utrum aliquis necessario vel involuntarie possit offendere Chris-
tum.
2. Utrum omnis peccans offendat Christum.
3. Utrum Christum semper offendat, qui conscientie sue erronee se 
conformat.
4. Utrum existens in gratia possit esse perplexus inter duo peccata.
5. Utrum omne peccatum sit malum.
6. Utrum gubernator humani generis juste gubernat genus huma-
num.109
Rodington is recorded as the 56th Lector of  the Oxford Franciscan 
convent, 1333–34, the same year he incepted,110 and the explicit in 
A has “Explicit Quodlibet fratris Iohannis de Rodingthon, doctoris 
Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, A. 
Lang, ed. (Münster 1935), pp. 1125–68.
108 Lechner, “Johannes von Rodington OFM und sein Quodlibet de conscientia,” pp. 
1139–40.
109 The wording of  this question title is slightly different in some manuscripts, but 
the meaning is the same in each case, and the manuscripts substantially agree on the 
text of  the question.
110 Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 1583.
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in theologia, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum,” so we can assume that the 
Quodlibet was magisterial and held at Oxford.
Relying on A, BS, BSt, and O, Lechner attempted a partial edition 
of  question 6. In the edited portion, one fi nds Rodington citing Anselm 
to solve the question of  how predestination relates to divine accepta-
tion, and citing Ockham’s (“per Magistrum”) discussion of  voluntas 
beneplaciti, particularly antecedens versus consequens,111 to explain how an 
omnipotent will may in some sense be frustrated. Ockham himself  says 
his view is just the common opinion, so it is not clear why Rodington 
cites Ockham in particular here, without also calling it the opinio com-
munis. Indeed, the edited portion of  the work shows in several places 
a reliance on connotation theory and Ockham-style semantic solutions 
to theological puzzles. It is diffi cult to make any fi rm judgments from 
the meager amount of  edited material, but it seems that one possible 
explanation for the popularity of  this work might lie in its clear, brief  
treatment of  gripping questions, and its tendency to summarize popular 
authorities.
Transition and Decline
To conclude this study, some discussion of  the shift away from record-
ing quodlibeta is in order.112 It should be clear from the preceding survey 
that in Ockham’s, Chatton’s, and Holcot’s quodlibeta we see vital and 
interesting source material, recording important stages of  debates on 
seminal topics. But they are also the last such collections we possess 
for Oxford theologians; no Oxford quodlibeta after Holcot survive. Why 
this abrupt decline?
Glorieux points out that this form of  disputation had fallen into 
some disfavor with Pope John XXII, who criticized the empty subtle-
ties of  vain philosophy therein, which drew the masters’ minds away 
from useful and edifying considerations of  canon law and sacred 
doctrine.113 Thus it could have been in part external pressure that led 
111 See his commentary on the Sentences I, d. 46, q. 1. William Ockham, Scriptum, eds. 
G. Etzkorn and F. Kelley, Opera Theologica IV (St Bonaventure, NY 1979), pp. 670–6.
112 See also W.J. Courtenay’s “Postscript” in this volume.
113 Thus he quotes a letter from Avignon dated 8 May 1317: “. . . alii quoque 
<magistri> solemnium disputationum et determinationum frequentiam consuetam ab 
olim in Parisiensi studio praetermittunt; quidam actu regentes, qui tenerentur insistere 
exercitio lectionum, litigiorum anfractibus et advocationum strepitibus, et forensibus 
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to the abandonment of  the genre. But it seems more likely that John 
XXII was refl ecting on dissatisfaction that existed in the studia them-
selves. The strong reasons for the decline are more likely internal to 
the university itself.
Regarding internal factors, Glorieux conjectures that in Paris at least 
this form of  disputation became so competitive for the masters that it 
simply burned itself  out from intensity.114 Certainly this explanation may 
also apply to Oxford. The evolution of  the genre at Oxford parallels in 
relevant particulars the evolution and demise on the continent.
Courtenay mentions a trend for including the results of  disputations 
and determinations into Sentences commentaries themselves, which would 
make it unnecessary to publish and circulate them separately.115 Hence 
it is possible that the rise of  Sentences commentaries is a partial cause 
eclipsing the motivation for circulating quodlibeta. But why the shift to 
Sentences commentaries in the fi rst place? One hypothesis, based on this 
study and so well illustrated in Ockham’s quodlibeta, is that the interde-
pendence of  particular personalities in quodlibetal disputes made them 
diffi cult to understand in isolation from larger debates, which debates 
were initiated early in a scholar’s career in his Sentences commentary. 
Since quodlibeta of  this complexity and interdependence made less and 
less sense outside the larger context of  the Sentences commentaries upon 
which they depended and which appeared fi rst in the career path, 
perhaps it made less and less sense to publish and to circulate them 
independently.
Whatever the causes of  the decline, it is clear that, with the excep-
tion of  Rodington’s small set from 1333–34, Ockham’s collection was 
the last to be widely circulated; in contrast to Holcot’s popular Sentences 
commentary, the Dominican’s quodlibetal questions seem not to have 
circulated or even to have been cited in his time; and Chatton’s col-
lection, while important for our modern understanding of  him and of  
Ockham, may not to have been all that important when it was written.116 
The written quodlibetal genre never reconstituted itself  in England in 
the form it had in the golden days.
occupationibus se involvunt; quidam etiam theologi, postpositis vel neglectis canonicis 
necessariis, utilibus et aedifi cativis doctrinis, curiosis, inutilibus et supervacuis philoso-
phiae quaestionibus et subtilitatibus se immiscent, ex quibus ipsius studii disciplina dis-
solvitur, luminis eius splendor offenditur, et postsequens studentium utilitas multipliciter 
impeditur . . .”; Glorieux I, p. 57.
114 Glorieux I, pp. 56–7.
115 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 252.
116 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 251–2.
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